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Abstract
The capacity to attribute beliefs to others in order to understand action is one of the mainstays of
human cognition. Yet it is debatable whether children attribute beliefs in the same way to all agents.
In this paper, we present the results of a false-belief task concerning humans and God run with a
sample of Maya children aged 4–7, and place them in the context of several psychological theories of
cognitive development. Children were found to attribute beliefs in different ways to humans and God.
The evidence also speaks to the debate concerning the universality and uniformity of the development
of folk-psychological reasoning.
© 2003 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Humans routinely attribute intentions, beliefs, and desires in order to interpret the behavior
of others. Other humans are seen as agents, that is, as entities that pursue goals in accordance
with their beliefs and desires. Attributions of agency are so ubiquitous that they are typically
taken for granted in everyday life. These attributions are not always correct in identifying the
beliefs and desires that underlie a speciﬁc action of an agent; yet, if people did not see others
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as agents, the capacity to understand their behavior would be severely impaired (for example,
people would be surprised when others got up and moved).
Abundant research documents children’s acquisition of human agent concepts over the ﬁrst
several years of life (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990), but
there is little work available on the development of non-human agent concepts. Yet, people
oftenattributeintentions,beliefs,anddesirestoanimalsaswellastoghosts,gods,demons,and
monsters. Scholars have long assumed that children ﬁrst acquire concepts of human agency
and then use them as templates to understand all non-human agents. One exception in this
regard is found in the work of Barrett and coworkers (Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001;
Richert & Barrett, 2004; see also Atran, 2002, for an evolutionary account of why children
cognize non-human agency).
In this article, we offer further support for Barrett’s point of view, showing that Yukatek
children do not reason in the same way about the agency of humans and God since early on in
development. In the ﬁrst part, we discuss the development of human agent concepts, speciﬁ-
cally with regard to the false-belief task. Then, we outline the predictions implied by several
theoretical positions concerning the development of children’s understanding of humans’ and
God’s beliefs. After that, we present experimental evidence from a Yukatek Maya sample that
supports the hypothesis that young children do not reason about God’s beliefs in human terms.
Finally, we discuss the theoretical positions and their predictions in light of the results and
place the evidence in the larger context of theory of mind research.
2. The development of human agent concepts
The cognitive literature on child development usually distinguishes three phases in the
development of understanding of agency (see for example, Csibra, Gergely, Biró, Koós, &
Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Biró, 1995; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997;
Wellman, 1990). During the ﬁrst year or so, children are believed to apply a principle of
rational action, that is, they begin to appreciate that humans do not merely propel themselves,
but do so in purposeful and rational ways. By the second or third year, children incorporate
simple mentalistic attributions into this rational principle: the purposeful and rational action
is understood to be driven by desires. Finally, during the fourth or ﬁfth year, the principle of
rational action is coupled with representational attributions: agents are seen as pursuing goals
in accordance to their beliefs.
The emergence of this representational stage, which is a necessary condition for the pos-
session of a full-ﬂedged conception of the mind, is the most relevant to the arguments and
experimental results presented in this article. Exactly when this transition takes place has been
a matter of considerable debate generating an abundance of research (e.g., Astington et al.,
1988; Carruthers & Smith, 1996; Whiten, 1991). Although some evidence has emerged for
the presence of representational reasoning in 3-year olds (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Hala,
Chandler, & Fritz, 1991; Lewis & Osbourne, 1990; Siegal & Beattie, 1991), the bulk of the
data available suggests that this ability is neither stable nor robust until children are 5 or
older (Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Moses, 1990; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wellman &
Bartsch, 1988; Wellman & Wooley, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).N. Knight et al./Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 117–126 119
Since Premack and Woodruff (1978) started experimenting with non-human primates in
order to establish the possibility that they had a ‘theory of mind,’ different ways of testing for
this have been designed and tried out. As Dennett (1978) pointed out, you can credit an entity
with a conception of belief only if there is evidence that it is able to understand that others
may entertain false beliefs. Therefore, to probe children’s representational understanding of
agency—whether they have a conception of belief—it is necessary to ascertain that they ﬁgure
out that people can have false beliefs and that these beliefs can motivate behavior.
A variety of false-belief tasks have been developed in the last 20 years to test children’s
understanding of beliefs. One such experiment is known as the ‘Sally-Ann’ test (Wimmer &
Perner, 1983). In this test, the child is made to look at a scene in which two dolls are animated
byexperimenters.Thedollsareusedtorepresenthumanbeings—Wellman,Cross,andWatson
(2001) have shown in a meta-analysis of false-belief studies that using a doll as a proxy for
an actual human being does not affect the outcome of the experiment. The two dolls enter the
stage; one of them (Sally) places an object in one of two containers and leaves the room. While
Sally is out, the second doll (Ann) moves the object into the second container. Sally re-enters
the stage; at that point, children are asked where Sally, who is unaware that the switch took
place, will look for the object. Children, therefore, are asked to infer whether Sally will act
according to her false belief (that the object is still in the original container) or not.
Another false-belief task, the one used in the experiments that will be presented later, is
known as the ‘surprising contents’ task. In it, children are shown a closed container (usually
a cracker box with a conspicuous picture of its contents on the outside) and asked what they
believe is in it. The experimenter then opens the box to reveal that the crackers have been
removed, and that small rocks (or a similarly unexpected item) have been put in their place.
After reclosing the box, the experimenter checks that the children are still clear on what the
box contains. The experimenter then introduces a doll who has not seen the inside of the box,
and asks what the doll would think is in the container. Again, the point of the experiment is to
establish whether children are capable of ﬁguring out that other agents may have false beliefs
and act accordingly.
3. The development of God concepts
By and large the research pertaining to children’s understanding of agent concepts deals
exclusively with human agent concepts: how children’s concepts of human agency become
increasingly specialized. In false-belief tasks, as well as in most other studies of children’s
understanding of agency, experimenters have asked children to reason about human actions,
beliefs, desires, and emotions. Very little available research addresses the generalizability of
children’s understanding of agency to non-human agents in general, and to God in particular.
However, by looking at the assumptions of several theoretical positions, we can envisage their
predictions concerning the understanding of God in comparison to humans in a false-belief
task.
In Fig. 1, we offer a tree diagram to show how these positions are related to each other. The
graphs outline predictions of false-belief task performance in relation to humans and God. To
illustrate the graphs, consider a surprising contents task: suppose children are presented with120 N. Knight et al./Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 117–126
Weak
 Strong 
  Non-similarity 
Similarity 
5
4
3
2
1
3  4          7   
3  4          7 
3  4          7   
3  4          7   
3  4          7 
Fig. 1. Predictions of false-belief task performance.
a closed cracker box, shown that the box contains small rocks, and then asked what a human
and God, who did not have a chance to look inside the box, would think is inside.
In all graphs, the top line represents attribution of beliefs to humans, and the bottom line
represents attribution of belief to God. On the Y-axis, performance is mapped; the higher the
line, the more likely it is that a child would attribute false beliefs to the agent in question—
to say that a human or God would think that the box contains crackers. The X-axis shows
the developmental time frame. As indicated by the dotted lines, the age range of 4–7 is
the most relevant to our discussion, since it is then that children, according to the current
literature, come to attribute false beliefs to human agents (see discussion in the previous
section).
At the highest level of the tree, the opposition is between similarity and non-similarity per-
spectiveswithregardtothewaybeliefsareattributedtoGodandhumans.Fromanon-similarity
perspective,childrenwouldstarttodifferentiatehumansandGod(attributingmorefalsebeliefs
to humans than to God) from the very beginning of the developmental stage of our concern.
Fromasimilarityperspective,childrenwouldattributeeithertruebeliefsorfalsebeliefstoboth
humans and God in equal measure, initially, and for at least some part of this developmental
time frame.N. Knight et al./Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 117–126 121
Similarity positions (graphs 1–4) postulate that children initially use humans (or some hu-
mans) as an analogical basis to understand God’s beliefs. At the very least, we can distinguish
two stances: a strong and a weak one. The strong stance is perhaps best represented in Piaget’s
work (1960). There are two possible interpretations of Piaget’s understanding of the devel-
opment of God concepts. In graph 1, an infallible parent (who is capable of knowing what
is inside the box without having to see it) is used as the basis to understand God until
quite late in development. At some point, children start to recognize that parents can en-
tertain false beliefs but they do not transfer this characteristic to God, since at this same
point they start to learn that God has special qualities such as omniscience. For example,
children would initially say that both agents believe that rocks are inside the box, then,
only by age 7, they would start to say that humans believe that crackers are inside the
box, and God believe that rocks are inside. Conversely, in graph 2, a normal human being
is used as the basis to understand God until quite late in development. Then, children start
to learn that God possesses certain special characteristics that set God aside from common
humans.
TheweakstancepostulatesthatchildreninitiallyusehumansasabasistounderstandGod’s
beliefs but start to differentiate them earlier in development than Piaget postulated—before
reaching the age of 7. In other words, we are envisaging the possibility of Piaget being wrong
simply in terms of the onset of the differentiation. In graph 3, an infallible human is used as a
basis to understand God. In graph 4, a normal human is instead used as the basis. This explains
why both the human and the God line stay ﬂat for some time in the ﬁrst instance, and climb
initially in the second. Although these positions are not well established in the literature, they
are possibilities that one should consider when dealing with cross-cultural data. For example,
graph4canbeseenasaplausiblerepresentationofpeoplelivinginasocietywheretheconcept
of God as omniscient is not very widespread.
Finally, moving on to the last graph in Fig. 1, a non-similarity perspective would predict
that children being tested on the false-belief task would start differentiating between humans
and God very early in development. This is the position that Justin Barrett and collaborators
have been advocating (Barrett et al., 2001; Richert & Barrett, 2004; see also Atran, 2002).
Their main idea is that young children do not need to conceptualize human agency ﬁrst and
then use it as a basis to understand supernatural agency; rather young children have already
the potential to think independently about different types of agents and reason accordingly. In
graph 5, the God line remains close to ﬂoor level, which signiﬁes that children from an early
age attribute mostly true beliefs to God, that is, that God knows that there are rocks in the box.
The human line, on the other hand, starts at the same level as the God line but then by the
age of 4 steeply climbs—children increasingly say that humans believe that the box contains
crackers, as their capacity to attribute false beliefs improves.
Experimental data from the United States supports the prediction of this non-similarity
position(Barrettetal.,2001).InFig.2,theresultsofasurprisingcontentsexperimentrunwith
a sample of American children recruited from Reformed and Lutheran Protestant churches are
presented. Children in the US sample can be seen to treat humans and God in the same way up
to age 4. By age 5, they already sharply differentiate between the two agents. The divergence
betweenGodandthemothertookplaceaschildrenstartedtoattributefalsebeliefstothelatter.
A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test for matched pairs comparing “crackers” responses between122 N. Knight et al./Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 117–126
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Fig. 2. False-belief task—US children.
mother and God at each speciﬁc age detected signiﬁcant differences only for 5- and 6-year
olds (z = 2.37, p = .018, N = 17 and z = 2.93, p = .003, N = 9, respectively).
However, there is no available cross-cultural evidence that addresses this question. In the
next section, we present data on a similar false-belief task run with a sample of Yukatek Maya
children, in order to provide a test of these theoretical predictions.
4. Methods
The Maya sample consisted of 48 children divided in four age groups: eleven 4-year olds
(4.0–4.11), twelve 5-year olds (5.0–5.11), twelve 6-year olds (6.0–6.11), and thirteen 7-year
olds (7.0–7.10). Twenty-six children were male and 22 were female. The experimenter piloted
the protocol with some 3-year olds, but, since most of them seemed to have difﬁculty in
concentrating long enough, they were dropped from the sample. The children resided in four
small rural villages in the Quintana Roo state in the Yucatán peninsula (Southeastern Mexico).
The overwhelming majority of people living in the rural interior of Quintana Roo are ethnic
Maya.
The children generally began attending preschool when they were 4- or 5-years old, and
started primary school when they turned six. Both the preschool and the primary school offer
bilingual education, in Spanish and Yukatek Mayan. Although many individuals below the age
of 50 are reasonably proﬁcient in Spanish, the favored language in the domestic environment
is Yukatek. For this reason, most of the children who enter preschool are virtually monolin-
gual in this language. All children were interviewed in Yukatek by a native speaker, who has
participated in several other studies in the region and is known to many of the participants’
families.N. Knight et al./Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 117–126 123
The experiment consisted in a version of the “surprising contents” task. Participants were
interviewedeitherinthehutoftheexperimentersorintheirfamily’shut.Theagentsusedwere
a doll named Soledad and the Catholic God (the Maya have adopted this religious entity into
their pantheon several centuries ago). We decided not to use the mother as stimulus in Yucatán
as it proved impossible to interview the children while their mother was away. In this situation,
it would not have been feasible to control for the possibility of the child thinking the mother
had a chance to see what was inside the container. The researchers used a container made out
of a dried squash, known in Yukatek as ho’ma, which keeps maize tortillas warm after cooking
them. The ho’ma has a small opening carved out on top, just large enough to put one’s hand
through. Every family visited by the experimenters owned at least one and usually several of
thesecontainers.Althoughtheymaybeoccasionallyusedtostoreotherobjects,therewashigh
consensus among the participants that the normal, appropriate content was indeed tortillas, as
measuredbycontrolquestionsaskedatthebeginningoftheexperiment(“whatisthiscontainer
called?”; “what would you usually ﬁnd in it?”).
The ho’ma’s opening was closed with a piece of cardboard, so that children could not tell
what was inside. One of the experimenters opened the container to reveal a pair of shorts, a
most unusual content. The container was closed again and the experimenters then asked the
set of questions about the doll and God, in the following form: “What does X think is in the
ho’ma?” In this experiment, children were not asked questions about other agents’ behavior.
However, Barrett et al. (2001) obtained very similar results when a sample of US children
were asked a question about behavior—“Where would agent X look for object Y?” instead of
“Where would agent X think the object is located?”
5. Results
Answers were coded as 1 when children said “tortillas” and 0 when they said “shorts.” The
percentage of children answering “tortillas” in each age group for the doll and God is shown
in Fig. 3.
The answers for the doll showed a statistically signiﬁcant positive correlation with age
[r(46) = .341]. Therefore, as age increased, Maya children were more likely to attribute
false beliefs to the doll. For example, 33% of the 4-year olds said that the doll would think
tortillas were in the container compared to 77% of 7-year olds. In contrast, children treated
God differently from the doll—as in the US, no signiﬁcant correlation was detected between
answers for God and age [r(46) = .066]. A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test for matched pairs
comparing “tortillas” responses found signiﬁcant differences between God and the doll for
5-year olds (z =− 2.000, p = .046, N = 12) and 7-year olds (z =− 2.449, p = .014,
N = 13), but not for 4- and 6-year olds.
When looking at the results, some patterns become apparent. The human line follows the
same developmental course in both samples, but the Maya children seem to reliably pass the
task about a year later than the American children. In the Maya sample, the difference between
God and humans is not signiﬁcant for 6-year olds, while it is both for 5- and 7-year olds.
Furthermore, Maya children do not seem to reach the near-ceiling levels that are reported
for many Euro-American samples of the same age on the ‘doll’ false-belief question: a t-test124 N. Knight et al./Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 117–126
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Fig. 3. False-belief task—Maya children. Error bars show ±1 standard error.
againstchancefor6-yearoldsdidnotreachsigniﬁcance(t(11) = 0.75,p = .082);even7-year
olds, while signiﬁcantly above chance (t(12) = 0.77, p = .047), are below the performance
level of the American sample.
6. Discussion
The vast majority of developmental studies of false-belief understanding in reference to
humans focus on samples of Euro-American and East Asian children, often from relatively
high SES backgrounds (see Wellman et al., 2001). The cross-cultural evidence available from
traditionalsocietiessofarisincompleteandinconclusive.Atanyrate,thetwoavailablestudies
of traditional populations (Avis & Harris, 1991; Vinden, 1996) and the present one seem to
show that there is some uniformity in the way false-belief understanding develops, at least
where human agency is concerned. However, even a brief inspection of the data presented
above reveals that Yukatek children seem to be able to reliably pass a false-belief task only
at age 7 (although their performance level is extremely close, though not signiﬁcantly above
chance, a year before); besides, they fail to reach near-ceiling levels at the same age as the
children in the American sample. One possible explanation is that children in this community
are less familiar than American children with the question/response format that characterizes
this experimental task. This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that we were not able to
successfullytestanadequatenumberof3-yearoldsduetotheirshyness,whichdoesnotusually
pose problems to American experimenters. Another problem, now related to the God results,
is the anomalous performance of 6-year old Maya children. This is less easily explained, but
may be due to small sample size. To fully account for the general delay in performance inN. Knight et al./Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 117–126 125
relation to humans, and the 6-year olds’ performance in relation to God, further studies are
needed.
Now turning to the general discussion of the theoretical positions and their predictions, we
can say that, while our results do not address the question of whether children consider the
mother as a special kind of agent, they do add to the US ﬁndings in speaking against the idea
that young children need to use humans as a basis to reason about God, which is the ratio-
nale behind all similarity positions. In this sense, the Maya results go in the direction of the
non-similarity position, thus providing cross-cultural evidence for the perspective advanced
by Barrett and collaborators.
ItisimportanttoemphasizethatthisimpliessimplythatyoungchildrendonottreatGodand
humans in the same way in terms of attribution of beliefs. That children truly understand God
as a different sort of agent, and not just a human with a few strange properties (e.g., infallible
beliefs, ability to make mountains, etc.) is difﬁcult to disambiguate. Also, by no means do
the data here support the claim that children’s concepts of God are completely independent of
their understanding of people in general and their parents in particular. For example, Christian
theology teaches about a God who practiced self-anthropomorphization by becoming human
in the form of Jesus of Nazareth.
The present results, however, clearly demonstrate that Yukatek young children, as well
as American young children, do not treat God as merely human. For this reason, this work
joins the growing literature that provides evidence against Piaget’s notion that young children
cannot treat other agents as importantly different from humans. For example, contrary to
Piagetian artiﬁcialism (Piaget, 1969), Petrovich (1997) found that, although 4-year olds know
that humans make machines and God does not, when asked to account for the origins of
natural objects such as large rocks or mountains, they gave God the credit and not people.
Similarly, several studies have uncovered evidence that 4-year old (and, in some cases, older)
children believe magicians are a special type of agent able to perform actions that apparently
violate natural causation (Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994). Further,
recent research suggests that 4- and 5-year olds appreciate differences in perceptual abilities of
different agents across sensory modalities (Richert & Barrett, 2004) and appreciate that God
is more likely than humans to possess various forms of perceptual knowledge (Barrett et al.,
2001).
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